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    SubjectRe: caps in elf, next itteration (the hack get's bigger)
    Hi!

    > I'm curious, Dr. von Brand; have you considered stickybit + immutable? (as
    > explained in my recent treatise to Richard ;-) It solves a lot of
    > problems and gives us:
    >
    > That's actually the best alternative I've heard to date.
    >
    > My objection to using setuid root as the flag is that this means that
    > even if you don't have root account (as Richard Gooch suggests), it
    > still is a problem because there are a huge number of executables that
    > are setuid root. And presumably, if a setuid root executable doesn't
    > have a capability information, then it in effect becomes setuid root
    > again. So it makes it easy for an attacker to hide a setuid root
    > executable in a capability system. This is why folks would be much

    Well, you "just" need utility like lscap which relisably shows what
    permissions program is going to run with.

    _IF_ you go for ext2-only solution, you may as well add capabilities
    into ext2 directly.

    > I suppose you could simply make a capibility-enabled kernel ignore the
    > setuid bit on setuid root executables that have no capabilities set. It
    > still doesn't solve the problem which Stephen brought up which is that
    > you might want an executable to be setuid to some userid (such as
    > daemon) and yet still have capabilities. So the stickybit + immutable
    > is probably the best alternative heard to date.

    Well - it changes something. You'll have to go out and tell everyone
    "stickybit + immutable is deadly combination". Many times.

    I do not have to do such things. setuid-marked executables actually
    look more dangerous than they are. WHICH IS RIGHT.

    Pavel
    --
    The best software in life is free (not shareware)! Pavel
    GCM d? s-: !g p?:+ au- a--@ w+ v- C++@ UL+++ L++ N++ E++ W--- M- Y- R+

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