Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: fsync on large files | Date | Thu, 18 Feb 1999 15:11:04 +0800 | From | David Luyer <> |
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Linus wrote, re: hardlinked directories:
> Imagine a > chroot() environment, for a moment - symlinks don't work to the outside, > but hardlinking does.
If Linux ever supports hardlinked directories, I really hope there's some way to prevent them. That's one of the reasons for the .. sanity check I thought.
Now: * attacker discovers a directory temporarily open (bad permissions) * attacker hardlinks to some of the files in there * the security checker notices the link count increase
The future: * attacker discovers a directory temporarily open (bad permissions) * attacker hardlinks to a subdirectory in it * you need yet another security check to check the link count on directories matches the number of real files in it, and the check has to watch for modifications as it is checking, etc, etc
It adds a whole new check to Linux security checkers, and a while new incompatibility to mainstream Unix.
Maybe I'm just paranoid. But every little change like this makes me worry. (I'm still not happy that ld.so doesn't protect execute-only binaries from LD_PRELOADs reading their code pages, and so on... you can't depend on Linux enforcing traditional Unix security)
David.
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