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    SubjectRe: malware defense

    I think that one good partial solution to security with modules anyway could

    - extending the module (/binary?) format in 2.4/2.5 to include digital
    - digitally signing modules via an encrypted digest
    - done by known, trusted organisation (eg Linus)
    - possibly enforced for 2.4/2.5 - ultimately this is required
    - integrated into the kernel
    - modifying modutils
    - add digital signature checking
    - maybe refuse to load module unless overridden with some flag in eg
    - log all non-trusted loading of modules

    This should work well, since the user will know whether the modules loading
    are trusted or not.

    I think this is a step in the right direction. Really, it shouldn't be hard
    to implement, apart from encryption exporting
    eg need to use 40-bit RSA encryption rather than 56-bit or 128-bit. IIRC
    there may have been a change about US policy regarding encryption export
    recently. 40-bit is a start anyway.

    Maybe an interim bonus would be to add a module checksum or something to see
    if it has been modified/hacked/infected, etc.

    Any ideas?
    Daniel J Blueman
    Undergraduate - BSc Computing Science
    UMIST university - Manchester
    Direct line: 0161 933 3569
    Mobile: 07775 583766

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