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    Subjectstrace can lie

    When you see snippet from strace, that says:

    open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY) = 3

    Do you trust it? You should not.

    Malicious program could open _any_ file on filesystem with this
    syscall. Here is example of such malicious program:

    char *c = 0x94000000;
    open( "/tmp/delme", O_RDWR );
    mmap( c, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED, 3, 0);
    *c = 0;
    if (fork()) {
    while(1) {
    strcpy( c, "/public" );
    strcpy( c, "/secret" );
    } else
    while (1)
    open( c, 0 );

    Depending on races, /public or /secret is printed with strace. This
    can be reproduced even on UP and easiest way to do so is to make
    /public file readable, and then look if you get

    [pid 224] open("/public", O_RDONLY) = 718
    [pid 224] open("/secret", O_RDONLY) = 719
    [pid 224] open("/public", O_RDONLY) = 720

    snippet like this. It is impossible for kernel to open non-existent
    file; that means that strace printed something that did not actually

    Any ideas how to get rid of this problem? It is nasty. It is very
    nasty and makes strace unusable for anything security-sensitive.
    PS: You don't need two processes sharing memory. Memory-mapped file
    will do the job. This was just illustration.
    I'm "In my country we have almost anarchy and I don't care."
    Panos Katsaloulis describing me w.r.t. patents me at

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