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SubjectRe: Chroot breach in 2.1.100+
On Mon, 21 Sep 1998, David Lang wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> assuming that you are smart enough to not give a process in a chroot box a
> file handle outside that box when you start it, is it still trivial to
> break out (as root) or is it now much more difficult?

No, as people have said over and over it is trivial.

You are missing the point below: you don't have to give the process a file
handle outside the chroot()ed area, they can make one by rechrooting.

>
> along the same lines, is it possible to chroot in a way that also changes
> the uid that the chrooted process is running under?

You can execute whatever code you want, sure.



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