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SubjectRe: [PATCH] [SECURITY] suid procs exec'd with bad 0,1,2 fds
David S. Miller wrote:

> It sure is, and the choice we're making is that people should fix the
> applications instead of putting a hack into the mainstream kernel.
>
> Because once the class of exploits is fixed in the applications, the
> kernel hack no longer is relevant. And given this situation, the
> thing we have to keep in mind is how bloody difficult it is take stuff
> out of the kernel.
>
> The golden rule is, if it can be fixed in userspace, make doing it
> there the preferred solution if it makes sense. And here it makes
> sense.
>
> This is the advantage of Linux, because Linus realizes how difficult
> it is to remove something from the kernel, and unlike a lot of
> commercial systems we do control strictly what gets in.
>
> Later,
> David S. Miller
> davem@dm.cobaltmicro.com
>

You are assuming that there will be such a time. Many of the buffer
overflows in current code are not ages old, but the results of new features
and/or bugfixes, and there will always be NEW applications. And while
administrators can always get new patches for their applications so
that the system will be safe, what about the hours or days from when the
hackers hear about the new hole on BUGTRAQ and begin to exploit and
when the administrators see it, wait for a patch, recompile, and restart the
affected services? It is not a significantly-sized patch, and would be a
great boost to people who have seen their systems hacked into via
new exploits before patches were available, and had to do extensive
security audits and restore from tape time and time again. It could
easily be a config option with many flags "THIS WILL BREAK THINGS"
in config.help and turned off by default. Or, if nothing else, the patch
could default to only making the stack non-executable for s*id programs
and those running as root.

Joseph Malicki


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