Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH] [SECURITY] suid procs exec'd with bad 0,1,2 fds | Date | Tue, 04 Aug 1998 21:23:03 -0300 | From | "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" <> |
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In message <Pine.LNX.3.96.980804182414.7515A-100000@z.ml.org>, linker@z.ml.org writes: +----- | On Wed, 5 Aug 1998, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote: | > On Tue, 4 Aug 1998 linker@z.ml.org wrote: | > > As for changing the address to someplace in libc, couldn't we relocated | > > all libs so that they have a null byte in their address? | > What are you trying to achieve with this? Sorry, I don't get it. | | The copy routines that people exploit copy null terminated strings. So the | exploiter must make their exploit code void of null characters, because | sending one will stop the copy. If you make it tougher to form a pointer | to that 'bad' functions without using null characters then it makes their | job harder. +--->8
So they do two copies instead of one, with the second placing the NUL where it's wanted. I see no major improvement here.
-- brandon s. allbery [os/2][linux][solaris][japh] allbery@kf8nh.apk.net system administrator [WAY too many hats] allbery@ece.cmu.edu electrical and computer engineering carnegie mellon university (bsa@kf8nh is still valid.)
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