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Hello guys, I now disagree with my previous opinion and think that the patch I submitted (and the corresponding half of Vadim's patch) is incorrect. In fact, on some other OS things behave in the way I thought are correct and I even raised a security_all to make things the way like Linux does. The reason I am changing my mind is (as Alan kindly explained) it is not secure to update sensitive parts (like mem) of /proc/<pid>/* after the program changed its identity. Perhaps we have two choices: a) leave things as they are now. b) provide a separate fill_inode() for each (or some) nodes in /proc/<pid>/* that should honour setuid(2)? What do you think, people? Regards, ------ Tigran A. Aivazian | http://www.sco.com/ Escalations Research Group | Email: tigran@sco.com Santa Cruz Operation Ltd | On Mon, 15 Jun 1998, Vadim E. Kogan wrote: > Hmm.. please look @ my previous post in linux-kernel. There are fixes > for both 2.0 and 2.1. In your fix you forgot to kill unneeded line. > > Vadim > - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu | ||||||||||||
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