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    SubjectRe: [patch] /proc fix and experimental security patch
    Alan Cox wrote:
    >
    > > - int ino = inode->i_ino & 0xffff;
    > >
    > > read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
    > > if (fill && (p = find_task_by_pid(pid)) != NULL) {
    > > - if (p->dumpable || ino == PROC_PID_INO) {
    > > - inode->i_uid = p->euid;
    > > - inode->i_gid = p->gid;
    > > - }
    > > + inode->i_uid = p->euid;
    > > + inode->i_gid = p->gid;
    >
    > This appears to be a security hole.
    >
    > Setuid processes in unix are driven on the basis that even if they drop the
    > setuid they may contain information that is 'private'. You can neither
    > ptrace nor core dump them. Now you appear to have added the ability to
    > access their 'mem' file in /proc freely
    Aha. That's why I was asking how it should be...

    So, what to do here? Maybe it's correct to have /proc/pid dir for that
    process be old uid/gid?

    Vadim

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