Messages in this thread | | | From | "Albert D. Cahalan" <> | Subject | Re: [patch 2.1.97] more capabilities support | Date | Wed, 22 Apr 1998 12:56:35 -0400 (EDT) |
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>> I believe we were discussing POSIX capabilities, not pure capabilities. >> >> I'll mail you about the pure capabilities later, but it appears that >> they are fairly useless outside of an environment like EROS: >> persistent system image, long-lived processes, NO FILESYSTEM, and >> every scrap of data is an object associated with some code. > > You haven't even looked at the design:)
I kept asking you for one (in private email)... where is it?
> All the features that you have named are because of a different design > of the operating system, don't you agree? So isn't it perhaps time that > we start to consider alternative concepts for mainstream operating > systems or at least start implementing known solutions to problems that > our systems have?
It is interesting, and perhaps it is useful for some people. It is _not_ anything like Linux and can't support basic POSIX features very well. For example, you have to give up much of the security and run Unix emulation if you want a real filesystem. (yeah, no kidding: we get rid of open(2) and just pass fd's around)
>> I hope everyone has seen this by now: >> http://agn-www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/people/1ott/rsbac/index.htm > > Yes, we have seen it, but the thesys is in German
I thought people were complaining about the web page in German. I just assumed everybody would grab to code itself, not the thesis. There is a patch against 2.0.33 and some user-space tools.
Summary:
At every point where security ought to be checked, he collects data needed for the check and passes it to a general security function. Most of the kernel gets a black-box view of security. The kernel maintains a database in /rsbac (on every mount point?) instead of modifying the ext2 filesystem. (that could be changed) There are a half-dozen security models implemented on his general framework.
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