Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 31 Mar 1998 12:48:10 +0200 (CEST) | From | Andreas Kostyrka <> | Subject | Re: Security patch for /proc |
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On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Chris Evans wrote:
> > On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > Here's a patch which prevents chrooted processes from escaping from > > their chrooted area via /proc. > > Hi, > > I'm not sure I agree with this approach -- perhaps root processes should > not be allowed to use the mount() syscall if root_dir != real_root. The > other main source of nastiness is ptrace() -- this needs to be banned in a > similar manner. There are other ways root could escape a chroot() > jail, we need to think about them and eliminate them one by one. - mknod()
Other are not that nasty, but still nasty: - bind(): the lower ports are reserved to root, so another box may trust that a connection is coming from a system program, and not a user process.
But before changing the WELL established rules about chroot (and root in a chroot environment was always dangerous), what about a new syscall: makesandbox()?
Andreas
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