[lkml]   [1998]   [Feb]   [24]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: PROPOSAL: Process Authentication Groups (PAGs) (fwd)
    On Mon, 23 Feb 1998, Malcolm Beattie wrote:

    > One thing which hasn't yet been mentioned is that file descriptors sent
    > across Unix domain sockets and SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control messages
    > actually provide a complete key-based authentication.
    > Further,
    > inheritance also "just works" since they're file descriptors.

    I can see that file descriptors can be used as opaque capabilities in the
    way you describe, but it's not clear that they are quite what we're
    looking for. The desired mechanism should serve to identify requests
    coming from the VFS layer. We can't rely on the user-level code to
    present a particular file descriptor as a capability. Scanning the
    process's file table for an authentication descriptor doesn't seem very
    appealing. Furthermore, isn't it possible that there might be programs
    out there that blithely close file descriptors they don't recognize--which
    could cause them to lose authentication in hard-to-understand ways?


    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to

     \ /
      Last update: 2005-03-22 13:41    [W:0.018 / U:1.888 seconds]
    ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site