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    SubjectRe: hardlinks.... sucks... ;-(
    While testing the million monkey theory, Yuri Kuzmenko said:
    >Disabling of hardlink for non-readable file not help for this situation ;-( I
    >will create the patch for disable user hardlinks for not-owned files. But
    >there is _UGLY_ patch. I look for better solution. Help me, pls.
    IMHO this is a Good Way(tm). You did almost the same thing that
    Solar Designer had done long time ago. I'm talking about his
    linux-stack-symlink patch. I think there should be SECURITY
    section in kernel config, with stack-non-exec, symlink patches etc.
    Of course marked as experimental and with proper warnings.
    Are there any chances to have this or shall we wait for 2.3
    series ? Comments, flames ?

    Cheers,
    Kris
    --
    Krzysztof G. Baranowski - President of the Harmless Manyacs' Club
    "Ex sysadmin, ex kernel hacker, luser again: How to copy a file ?"
    http://www.knm.org.pl/ <prezes@manjak.knm.org.pl>

    Your patch on 2.1.76:

    --- namei.c.orig Mon Dec 29 16:31:37 1997
    +++ namei.c Mon Dec 29 16:41:52 1997
    @@ -1168,6 +1168,13 @@
    if (!old_dentry->d_inode)
    goto exit_lock;

    + if ((old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid != current->euid) &&
    + (old_dentry->d_inode->i_gid != current->egid)) {
    + dput(old_dentry);
    + printk("*** Security warning: UID %lu try to make the hardlink from foreign file \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",(unsigned long)current->euid,oldname,newname);
    + return -EPERM;
    + }
    +
    error = permission(old_dir->d_inode,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
    if (error)
    goto exit_lock;

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