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    SubjectRe: Linux proc exploit
    Alan Cox wrote:
    >
    > > What if we had per-process securelevel flag, inherited at fork etc., which
    > > would make (f)suser return 0 everytime for these processes?
    >
    > A simple hack to do this is to make suser() check you are not chrooted
    > but you can equally have no root stuff in the chroot area

    There was a discussion a while back on comp.security.unix (?)
    about whether it was possible to allow chroot() for ordinary
    users. The general conclusion seemed to be that it might
    be possible so long as chroot'd processes are not permitted
    to execute any suid programs. But there may be other nasty
    security implications to this ... Can anyone think of any
    objections? It would certainly be useful to allow, say, users'
    cgi-bin scripts to chroot to a safe environment to reduce
    security risks.

    Chroot() is a very neat feature but because it is limited
    to root only, it's not very widely used.

    Rich.

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