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    SubjectRe: Misc Fixes
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    Zefram said this, and I just had to respond:
    >
    > >Tried getting this patch through during 1.3; Linus rejected it as making
    > >it too easy for module to circumvent securelevel. The fix he wanted was
    > >write a functional interfaces so that it would be possible for ext2 to
    > >obtain the current securelevel settings, without being able to set it.
    [...]
    > A function such as you describe will effectively give away the address
    > of securelevel to malicious code (it knows where the function is and
    > doesn't need to do as much as a disassembly), but will still hinder
    > legitimate code. The obvious solution is to disallow loading/unloading
    > of modules at a sufficiently high securelevel.

    Not to jump in or anything, but...
    How about a small kernel function to return the current securelevel value?
    int get_securelevel();
    Then export THAT to modules.

    Robey



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