lkml.org 
[lkml]   [1996]   [Dec]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
    /
    From
    SubjectRe: Allowing users to set set[ug]id bits
    Date

    Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
    > From: marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl (Marek Michalkiewicz)
    > Date: Wed, 18 Dec 1996 19:10:51 +0100 (MET)
    >
    > BTW, the idea is not mine - SCO UNIX supports something like this, so
    > I thought it would be good to have that in Linux too (SCO sucks when
    > it comes to performance, but they have some nice security features;
    > I think we can have both performance and security). Quoting from the
    > SCO man page:
    >
    > setpriv(S)
    >
    > This is part of the POSIX.6 security specification, which is something
    > *additional* that you can layer on top of Linux. Note that it doesn't
    > turn completely destroy the ability to make setuid programs, but it
    > allows the system administrator to restrict (and many other things) on a
    > very fine-grained basis.

    It might also be considered as a pre-requisite for ever getting Linux to C2
    [See the *first* paragraph of the C2 discussion (paragraph 2.2.1.1) in the
    Orange book: ftp://csrc.nist.gov/pub/csrc/secpubs/rainbow/index.html ].

    Best wishes

    Andrew

    PS. Personally, I like LD's remarks about an API+modular kernel approach to
    decisions of this sort. I could imagine a future in which you slot in your
    prefered module for D (for those that want security like that found in DOS)
    through C1-2, B1-2-3 or whatever you like....

    --
    Linux-PAM: http://parc.power.net/morgan/Linux-PAM/index.html
    libpwdb: http://parc.power.net/morgan/libpwdb/index.html

    \
     
     \ /
      Last update: 2005-03-22 13:38    [W:0.020 / U:0.112 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site